I recently came across a news report covering the press conference announcing the pre-launch of a book on zoning in Enugu State by my friends, Dr. Cyril Uchenna Anioke, Dr. Ambrose Igboke, Dr. Chikezie Obasi, and Mr. Clinton Ume. Although I have not yet had the opportunity to engage with the full manuscript, the reported remarks attributed to the authors are sufficiently substantive to warrant an immediate set of preliminary reflections.
At the centre of their argument is the proposition that the zoning arrangement in Enugu State has contributed significantly to political stability. This is an important claim that resonates with long-standing interpretations of zoning as a conflict-management and power-sharing mechanism within Nigeria’s subnational political architecture. Stability, particularly in heterogeneous and politically competitive environments, is an undeniable governance asset.
However, stability, on its own, is an incomplete analytical and normative benchmark. It does not, by itself, resolve questions of inclusion, institutional depth, democratic competitiveness, or developmental performance. It is therefore necessary to interrogate not only whether zoning produces stability, but also the nature of that stability, its distributional consequences, and the institutional mechanisms through which it is produced and sustained.
It is within this analytical context that I offer the following reflections, drawing on insights from elite bargaining theory, consociational governance, and the political economy of subnational settlements.
*Zoning as Elite Bargaining: Order Without Openness?*
At its core, zoning reflects a classic form of elite bargaining, an informal agreement among politically relevant actors to rotate access to power in order to reduce uncertainty and manage conflict. In environments characterised by weak institutions and high-stakes political competition, such arrangements can serve as pragmatic stabilisers. They lower the intensity of electoral contestation and create predictable pathways to executive authority.
Enugu State is often cited as an example where such an arrangement has contributed to relative political calm.
Yet elite bargains, by their very nature, are double-edged. While they may reduce overt conflict, they can also constrain democratic competition by pre-determining outcomes, narrowing the field of viable candidates, and reinforcing negotiated rather than contested succession. Over time, such arrangements risk evolving into mechanisms of controlled political reproduction rather than open electoral choice.
The critical question, therefore, is not whether zoning produces order, but whether that order is democratically generative or politically restrictive.
*Consociationalism Without Institutional Depth*
Zoning is often conceptually aligned with consociational theory, which emphasises power-sharing among distinct groups in divided societies as a means of preventing domination and sustaining stability. In classical consociational systems, however, power-sharing is anchored in formal institutions, explicit rules, and enforceable guarantees of inclusion.
In Enugu State, zoning appears to function primarily as an informal and elite-driven arrangement rather than a codified institutional framework. This creates important structural ambiguities.
If zoning is not consistently mirrored beyond the senatorial level to local governments, communities, and electoral wards, then it becomes fragmented, producing inclusion at the macro level while potentially entrenching exclusion at sub-zonal levels. If it does not extend meaningfully to elective and appointive offices, it risks becoming symbolic at the apex of power while leaving underlying structures of patronage and appointment largely unaffected. If candidate selection remains concentrated within a narrow circle of political actors, then zoning begins to resemble gatekeeping rather than genuine power-sharing.
In this sense, what exists may be better described as a form of “thin consociationalism”, an arrangement that achieves elite accommodation without deep institutional embedding.
*Subnational Political Settlements: Stability at What Cost?*
From the perspective of subnational political settlements theory, zoning can be understood as part of a broader equilibrium among influential actors who negotiate access to state power in order to prevent destabilising conflict. Such settlements are neither unusual nor inherently illegitimate in contexts where formal institutions are still evolving.
However, their developmental and democratic value depends on their outcomes.
A settlement that ensures peace without performance, rotation without representation, and elite inclusion without broad-based empowerment risks locking the political system into a low-level equilibrium trap. In such a scenario, stability becomes static rather than developmental, and political order may coexist with persistent governance deficits.
This leads to a more fundamental evaluative question. Has zoning in Enugu State generated measurable improvements in governance performance, or has it primarily redistributed political opportunity among elite blocs?
*The Missing Institutional Questions*
A more rigorous assessment of zoning requires engagement with several underexplored but critical questions.
First, is zoning a coherent system applied consistently across governance tiers, or is it confined primarily to the governorship, thereby generating asymmetries within zones themselves?
Second, does zoning extend beyond executive office to legislative and appointive positions, or does it operate selectively in ways that may concentrate power while projecting an image of inclusion?
Third, has zoning ever functioned as a genuinely competitive arrangement in which cross-zonal candidacy is viable, or has it gradually evolved into a de facto constraint on political ambition?
Fourth, through what institutional mechanisms are zoning arrangements determined? Are they the product of formal party rules, broadly consultative processes, or decisions taken by a narrow set of political elites or the incumbent governor?
Finally, beyond its stabilising effects, what empirical evidence exists to demonstrate that zoning has improved governance outcomes in terms of service delivery, accountability, and development performance?
Without clear answers to these questions, zoning remains analytically incomplete and normatively ambiguous.
*Towards a More Coherent Framework*
The choice confronting Enugu State is not a binary one between retaining or abolishing zoning. Rather, it is a question of institutional refinement.
A more coherent approach would involve soft rather than rigid zoning, preserving its stabilising benefits while maintaining meaningful political competition. It would require the integration of merit-based considerations within zonal arrangements to prevent the dilution of competence. It would also necessitate broader institutionalisation across multiple levels of governance to reduce fragmentation and ensure internal equity. Importantly, it would demand greater transparency and inclusiveness in the processes through which zoning decisions and candidacies are determined.
In this regard, zoning should be conceived not as an end in itself, but as a transitional mechanism that supports the gradual strengthening of more robust democratic institutions.
*Between Stability and Stagnation*
Zoning in Enugu State should neither be dismissed as undemocratic nor celebrated uncritically as a stabilising panacea. It is, more accurately, a pragmatic political arrangement that has likely contributed to elite accommodation and reduced overt conflict in a competitive subnational environment.
However, the central question is whether this stability is transformative or merely preservative.
If zoning remains primarily an elite bargaining instrument without deep institutional anchoring, it risks evolving into a structured form of exclusion that rotates access to power without fundamentally expanding its substance. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to maintain stability, but to ensure that stability becomes a platform for inclusion, accountability, and improved governance performance.
Only then can zoning move from being a political workaround to becoming part of a genuinely developmental political settlement. God is with us!
By Prof. Chiwuike Uba, Ph.D